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S U M M A R Y
Objectives: To compare modes and sources of infection and clinical and biosafety aspects of accidental
viral infections in hospital workers and research laboratory staff reported in scientiﬁc articles.
Methods: PubMed, Google Scholar, ISI Web of Knowledge, Scirus, and Scielo were searched (to December
2008) for reports of accidental viral infections, written in English, Portuguese, Spanish, or German; the
authors’ personal ﬁle of scientiﬁc articles and references from the articles retrieved in the initial search
were also used. Systematic review was carried out with inclusion criteria of presence of accidental viral
infection’s cases information, and exclusion criteria of absence of information about the viral etiology,
and at least probable mode of infection.
Results: One hundred and forty-one scientiﬁc articles were obtained, 66 of which were included in the
analysis. For arboviruses, 84% of the laboratory infections had aerosol as the source; for alphaviruses alone,
aerosol exposure accounted for 94% of accidental infections. Of laboratory arboviral infections, 15.7% were
acquiredpercutaneously,whereas41.6%ofhospital infectionswerepercutaneous. Forairborneviruses, 81%
of the infections occurred in laboratories, with hantavirus the leading causative agent. Aerosol inhalation
was implicated in 96% of lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus infections, 99% of hantavirus infections, and
50% of coxsackievirus infections, but infective droplet inhalation was the leading mode of infection for
severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus and themucocutaneousmode of infection was involved in
the case of infection with inﬂuenza B. For blood-borne viruses, 92% of infections occurred in hospitals and
93% of these had percutaneous mode of infection, while among laboratory infections 77% were due to
infective aerosol inhalation. Among blood-borne virus infections there were six cases of particular note:
three cases of acute hepatitis following hepatitis C virus infection with a short period of incubation, one
laboratory case of human immunodeﬁciency virus infection through aerosol inhalation, one case of
hepatitis following hepatitis G virus infection, and one case of fulminant hepatitis with hepatitis B virus
infection following exposure of the worker’s conjunctiva to hepatitis B virus e antigen-negative patient
saliva. Of the 12 infections with viruses with preferential mucocutaneous transmission, seven occurred
percutaneously, aerosol was implicated as a possible source of infection in two cases, and one atypical
infectionwithMacacine herpesvirus 1with fatal encephalitis as the outcome occurred through a louse bite.
One outbreak of norovirus infection amonghospital staff had as its probablemodeof infection the ingestion
of inocula spread in the environment by fomites.
Conclusions: The currently accepted and practiced risk analysis of accidental viral infections based on the
conventional dynamics of infection of the etiological agents is insufﬁcient to cope with accidental viral
infections in laboratories and to a lesser extent in hospitals, where unconventional modes of infection are
less frequently present but still have relevant clinical and potential epidemiological consequences.
Unconventional modes of infection, atypical clinical development, or extremely severe cases are
frequently present together with high viral loads and high virulence of the agents manipulated in
laboratories. In hospitals by contrast, the only possible association of atypical cases is with the individual
resistance of the worker. Current standard precaution practices are insufﬁcient to prevent most of the
unconventional infections in hospitals analyzed in this study; it is recommended that special attention be
given to ﬂaviviruses in these settings.
 2011 International Society for Infectious Diseases. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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Accidental viral infections among workers of hospitals or
research laboratories are an emerging threat due to reasons among
which stand out the growing volume of virological research done
including with biohazard class 3 or 4 agents;1 the emerging or
reemerging viruses such as the severe acute respiratory syndrome
coronavirus (SARS-CoV; epidemic of 2003), Marburg virus (MARV;
the worst outbreak of MARV hemorrhagic fever took place in
Angola in 2005), the reemergence of dengue hemorrhagic fever in
the Americas in the 1980 s, the introduction of West Nile virus
(WNV) in North America in 2000; and the global amount of
hepatitis C virus (HCV) or human immunodeﬁciency virus (HIV)
carriers (about 100 million and 40 million, respectively). This
hazard has been increased by the concept of epidemiological
transition that prevails in developed countries despite its clear
refutation by the above data.
Hospitals and research laboratories are special environments
with respect to the transmission of infection, given the modiﬁed
susceptibility of the population present (larger proportion of
immunocompromised individuals in hospitals, far greater vaccine
coverage among workers than in the average population). The
intensity and deepness of contact, and the concentration and
invasiveness of the pathogens encountered are also higher than
those found in conventional settings.
EpiNet (the Exposure and Prevention Information Network)
statistics show 590 164 percutaneous and 196 721mucocutaneous
exposures to blood for health care workers in hospitals in the USA
in 1996, 39% of these without notiﬁcation.2 This study evidenced
an average of 5.4 percutaneous exposures of resident surgeons per
year at a hospital in Toronto with a notiﬁcation rate of only 5%,2
supporting the above points about invasive exposure in hospitals.
An exceptional example of the unique character of the
environments mentioned is the accidental release of infective
aerosols containing weaponized Bacillus anthracis that occurred in
Yekaterinburg in 1979. Seventy-seven persons became sick and 66
died from infections, the victims scattered over a 4.02 km radius.
The source aerosols had an estimated mass ranging from
milligrams to some grams.3 The dispersion and stabilization
power of the aerosol vehicle over the inoculum and the
fundamental vulnerability of research laboratories to these
particles as infective vehicles are evident given the frequency
and the volume of aerosol generating procedures. These aerosol
particles are liquid, solid, ormixed particulate bodies in suspension
in a ﬂuid (in this case air), whose size varies from 0.01 mm to
10 mm, hence being extremely light and able to remain in
suspension for long periods of time.
The fundamental aims of this study were to establish and
compare the modes of infection in accidental viral infections in
research laboratories and hospitals, taking into account their
presentations and their classiﬁcation by conventional transmis-
sion mode, and the biosafety aspects involved.
2. Methods
This was a systematic review of articles published during the
period 1930 to 2008. The inclusion criteria for the retrieved articles
were the presence of an accidental viral infection in workers or
students in research laboratories or hospitals and the presence of
respective case reports. Exclusion criteria were the absence of the
casuistics in the above thematic, the absence of the determination
of the viral etiology, or the lack of at least a probable mode of
infection.
The following academic Internet search systems were used:
PubMed, Google Scholar, ISI Web of Knowledge, Scirus, and Scielo.
They were searched with the keywords ‘‘virus laboratory infec-tion’’, ‘‘virus hospital infection’’, ‘‘accidental virus infection’’,
‘‘accidental infection by virus’’, and their translations in Portu-
guese, German and Spanish. The references of the articles obtained
were also used as sources. Previous articles available to the authors
that met the inclusion criteria and were not eliminated by the
exclusion criteria were also analyzed.
Percentages of infections by virus or virus groups respective to
the various modes of infection were calculated and summary
tables were produced.
3. Results
3.1. Search results
From the literature search, 141 articles were collected for the
systematic review; 66 of these were selected for the analysis.4–69
Those eliminated by fulﬁllment of the exclusion criteria are
presented in the Supplementary Material. Of the 66 analyzed
articles, 31 reported hospital infections, accounting for 241 of the
infections analyzed. Thirty-ﬁve analyzed articles related 219
laboratory infections, including one article that reported both
laboratory and hospital infections.
3.2. Description and analysis of the cases
3.2.1. Arbovirus infections
Fifty arbovirus infections were analyzed of which 22 were
caused by ﬂaviviruses, 16 by alphaviruses, six by bunyaviruses
(ﬁve by Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever virus (CCHFV) and one
by Rift Valley fever virus (RVFV)), and six by Piry virus
(vesiculovirus, Rhabdoviridae). Of the 50 cases, 38 occurred in
laboratories and 12 in hospitals.
In one instance dating from 1935, a hospital infection with
yellow fever virus (YFV) occurred through the mucocutaneous
mode of infection, speciﬁcally exposure of the skin, which was
reported to be unbroken, to the blood of a yellow fever patient.
After 10 days, this health care worker developed fever and
splenomegaly; 1 day later he developed jaundice and diarrhea, and
subsequently petechiae, melena and delirium, with facial muscle
contractions. On the following day, the worker died. The clinical
picture of this exceptional case is consistent with yellow fever
hemorrhagic fever.4
A case reported in 1939 concerns a laboratory infection caused
by the western equine encephalitis virus (WEEV) percutaneously;
the woman presented fever and headache 10 days after entering
the laboratory and starting work with WEEV. Five days after the
ﬁrst symptoms, the fever peaked (40 8C) and convulsions
progressing to coma and death on the following day overcame.5
Another exceptional case of laboratory WEEV infection was
reported in 1940 and occurred as a researcher had the mucosa
of the facial cavities exposed to highly concentrated chicken
embryo viral inocula and aerosol released in a centrifugation
accident that dispersed visible viral inocula over a considerable
extent of the laboratory room surfaces. The researcher had not
been using goggles or a protectionmask at the time of the accident.
Fourteen days after the accident, the researcher presented
headache, nausea, and vomiting, and 2 days later a fever of
39.4 8C. Manifestations of irritability, spasms of superior members’
muscles, delirium and lethargy resulted in his hospitalization. The
fever peaked at 42.2 8C and cardiac frequency reached 140 bpm, 8
days after ﬁrst symptoms death occurred due to meningo-
encephalitis.6 The researcher’s failure to use personal protective
equipmentwas critical in his exposure to the inocula in the amount
involved in this infection.
In 1943, eight cases of VEEV (Venezuelan equine encephalitis
virus) infection occurred at a laboratory, for which the original
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infection. This report cited dust particles as the source and
infective particle inhalation as themode of infection.7 The period of
incubation ranged from 2 to 4 days, and the clinical presentation
was of fever and biphasic headache, with cases considered as being
normal to severe VEEV infections.
In four cases of VEEV infection at a laboratory, originally
reported in 1947, aerosol inhalation was considered the mode of
infection. Cases included a biochemist who worked in the room
next to the virology work room, which he had never entered.8 The
virology work room was used for the production of viral stocks in
chicken embryos, with high viral titers.
The two remaining alphavirus infections occurred in two
laboratories in which aerosol inhalation was the mode of
infection. The ﬁrst was an infection of a researcher by
chikungunya virus (CHIKV), which was originally reported in
1965.9 In this instance a suspension of 10% infected mouse brain
was used to infect mosquitoes through a nylon membrane. The
researcher hadhad nodirect contactwith the viral suspension and
was certiﬁed as having had no mosquito bites during the
procedure, leaving only aerosol as the source of infection.
Following 8 days of incubation the researcher presented with
fever, muscular pain, and rash, and only lymphocytosis as a
remarkable feature, being this a mild normal presentation of
CHIKV infection.9 The last case of alphavirus infection was a
laboratory infection with Mayaro virus (MAYV) reported in 1999
in which the mode of infection was aerosol inhalation. This
occurred during a sucrose–acetone antigen extraction procedure,
followed by obtainment of solid antigen by dehydration with the
use of a vacuum pump.10 The infection with aerosol as source was
demonstrated, and developed clinically following 6 days of
incubation with fever and indistinct and mild clinical course,
which is expected for normal MAYV infections.10
All 16 of these accidental infections by alphaviruses took place
in laboratories and were predominantly caused by infective
aerosol inhalation. The severity of the WEEV infections is of note,
as this virus is considered less virulent than eastern equine
encephalitis virus (EEEV) and VEEV in conventional natural
infections.70
Of the total 22 accidental infections by ﬂaviviruses analyzed,
sevenoccurred inhospitals, onecausedbyYFVand theotherscaused
by dengue virus (DENV). Two resulted from the mucocutaneous
mode of infection (exposure of the worker’s conjunctiva to blood of
thepatientwithdengue fever, andexposureof anotherworker’s skin
to a small amount of blood from a yellow fever patient). The ﬁve
remainingDENV infections had percutaneousmode of infection. For
the15 laboratory cases, themodesof infectionwerepercutaneous in
ﬁve cases and aerosol inhalation in 10.
The series of louping ill virus (LIV) accidental infections
comprises two reports of three cases each. In the ﬁrst, the mode
of infection was only pinpointed for one case and was percutane-
ouswith inoculation of a viral suspension of 105mouse LD50 (lethal
dose 50%)  0.03 ml (high viral titer). The clinical presentation
followed 6 days of incubation and included fever, sore throat, neck
swelling, severe headache, and vomiting, which resulted in
hospitalization. The other two cases had biphasic meningo-
encephalitis after 6 days of incubation, one ofwhomalso presented
ketoacidosis, coma, and conjunctival hemorrhage.11 In the second
report, two percutaneous infections and onewith aerosol as source
of infection were reported; the period of incubation ranged from 5
to 8 days (in the case of aerosol inhalation). In both percutaneous
cases, fever, headache, and local lymphadenopathy occurred, while
the aerosol case presented clinically with fever, retro-orbital pain,
lack of coordination, nausea, and severe diarrhea. In this latter case
viral suspensions with high viral titers were again handled, while
the two percutaneous cases had worked with infected mice.12Five laboratory infections of tick-borne encephalitis virus
(TBEV) were reported, and the source of infection was established
as aerosol for four of these cases;13–15 the remaining case was
excluded from further analysis. Two of the cases had a period of
incubation of 10 days, with fatal meningo-encephalitis as the
outcome for one and an inapparent infection in the other.13,14 One
of the remaining cases had aerosol inhalation as the probablemode
of infection, but the report did not describe the clinical
development.13 The last case in this series occurred as a researcher
processed a viral suspension of 10% infected mouse brain (high
viral titer), with aerosol inhalation as the probable mode of
infection. After 14 days of incubation, fever (40 8C), myalgia,
arthralgia, and severe headache without neurological alterations
manifested, comprising a normal clinical picture for TBEV
infections.15
A laboratory infection with Saint Louis encephalitis virus
(SLEV), with aerosol as the source of infection but no further
details, is mentioned among a number of other accidental viral
infections by Pike;16 but like Hanson et al.13 who described 424
laboratory arboviral infections, all but this one case were excluded
from the analysis due to the absence of critical information as
deﬁned in the exclusion criteria.
Three cases of Kyasanur Forest disease virus (KFDV) laboratory
infection with aerosol inhalation as the mode of infection were
reported. The incubation period was 5 days, and was followed by
conjunctivitis andmild respiratory symptoms in one case, myalgia,
hyperesthesia and high viscosity of the skin in another case, and
polyarthralgia, hyperesthesia and meningitis in the ﬁnal case.17
These presentations are consistent with the conventional clinical
spectrum for KFDV.
There were three laboratory infections with WNV: one had
infective aerosol inhalation as the mode of infection, while the
other two had percutaneous mode of infection. The case due to
aerosol inhalation had an incubation period of 5 days and then
fever with a normal mild clinical outcome.16,18 The two
percutaneous infection cases had incubation periods of 3 to 4
days and fever with mild respiratory symptoms in one and fever
withmaculopapular rash in the other, all within the normal clinical
range for WNV infections.19
The 12 accidental arboviral infections that occurred in
hospitals analyzed in this study included seven as a result of
the mucocutaneous mode of infection (one YFV infection, one
DENV infection, and ﬁve CCHFV cases) and ﬁve by percutaneous
mode caused by DENV, with the period of incubation ranging
from 4 to 8 days and the development of classical dengue
fever.4,20–24Three cases of RVFV infection occurring at a
laboratory were reported in 1935.25 The mode of infection was
established as aerosol inhalation for only one of these cases. It
must be pointed out that although the clinical development was
of mild viral fever, the incubation period ranged from 30 to 90
days, while the normal incubation period for natural RVFV
infection is up to 6 days.25 The analyzed cases of CCHFV infection
resulted from a single hospital cluster in which one patient
presenting hemorrhagic fever due to infection with this virus was
examined by a physician whose skin was exposed to bloody
vomit during the procedure. After this mucocutaneous exposure,
the physician developed fever, leukopenia, and hemorrhages
consistent with hemorrhagic fever caused by this virus, and
recovered 1 month later. The four remaining cases were exposed
to the virus during a surgical procedure on the above mentioned
patient, in which a surgeon and an assistant ofﬁcer had close
contact with the patient and an anesthetist and another member
of the surgical team also had contact with the patient’s blood.
Hence the mode of infection was probably mucocutaneous,
although the possibility of infective aerosol exposure from the
patient’s airways cannot be discounted. All four of these cases
Table 1
Summary table for accidental infections with arboviruses in the laboratory and hospital settings: total number of cases analyzed, overview of percentages according to the
main modes of infection, and clinical development characteristics
Setting Genus Virus Transmission route Clinical development Total number
of cases
Ref.
Percutaneous Aerosol
exposure/
inhalation
Mucocutaneous
Laboratory Alphavirus WEEV 50 50a 50a Lethal (100) 2 5,6
VEEV 100 Normal 12 7,8
CHIKV 100 Normal 1 9
MAYV 100 Normal 1 10
Total cases 6 94 6a (See above) 16 5–10
Flavivirus LIV 75 25 b 4 11,12
TBEV 100 Unapparent to severe 4 13–16
KFDV 100 Normal to severe 3 17
SLEV 100 Not described 1 13
WNV 66 33 Normal 3 16,18,19
Total cases 33 66 (See above) 15 11–19
Phlebovirus (Bunyaviridae) RVFV 100c Long incubation period 1 25
Vesiculovirus (Rhabdoviridae) Piry 100 Normal 6 26
Total laboratory cases (See above) 38 5–19,25,26
Hospital Flavivirus DENV 83 17 Normal 6 20–23
YFV 100 Severe (lethal) 1 4
Total cases 71.5 28.5 (See above) 7 4,20–23
Nairovirus CCHFV 100 Normal (hemorrhagic
fever in all,
lethal in two cases)
5 24
Total hospital cases 41.6 58 (See above) 12 4,20–24
WEEV, western equine encephalitis virus; VEEV, Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus; CHIKV, chikungunya virus; MAYV, Mayaro virus; LIV, louping ill virus; TBEV, tick-
borne encephalitis virus; KFDV, Kyasanur Forest disease virus; SLEV, Saint Louis encephalitis virus; WNV,West Nile virus; RVFV, Rift Valley fever virus; DENV, dengue virus;
YFV, yellow fever virus; CCHFV, Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever virus.
a Refers to the same case.
b Comparison was impossible as there is no reference for the normal clinical development.
c Refers to the only case whose mode of infection was established.
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surgeon and the assistant ofﬁcer.24
The six reported laboratory accidental infections with Piry
virus, a vesiculovirus (Rhabdoviridae family), had aerosol inhala-
tion as the probablemode of infection. One of these cases had fever,
myalgia, headache, and elevated transaminase levels.26
Among accidental arbovirus infections, 11 cases were the result
of percutaneous infection and 32 had aerosol involvement. All of
those with aerosol involvement took place in laboratories in a total
of 38 analyzed cases of these settings; with the respective data
presented in Table 1.4,11–26 The DENV infections were an exception
to the above general trend for accidental arbovirus infections,
accounting for six of the hospital infections, including all the cases
linked to the percutaneous mode of infection corresponding to
41.6% of the arboviral infections in these settings, as presented in
Table 1. The DENV percutaneous cases constituted 45.4% of the
total percutaneous arbovirus infections analyzed in this study.
3.2.2. Airborne viruses
A total of 197 cases of accidental infectionwith airborne viruses
were analyzed. Of these, 160 occurred in laboratories and 37 in
hospitals; 175 resulted from aerosol inhalation and 15 from
droplet inhalation.
The series of reports of accidental infection with airborne
viruses begins with two cases, one reported in 1942 and the other
in 1943. Both were laboratory infections with lymphocytic
choriomeningitis virus (LCMV). In the ﬁrst case, the mode of
infection was arthropod vectorization, as the infection resulted
from the bites of lice from a dying infected monkey; this infection
developed clinically with leukopenia, paralysis, and meningo-
encephalitis.27 The second case occurred upon the generation of
infective aerosol due to the explosion of a celluloid tube submitted
to a ﬂame; the tube contained a suspension of 10% infected guinea
pig spleen. After 17 days of incubation, this case presented
clinically fever, dry cough, jaundice, leukopenia, and pneumonia.28One case of Machupo virus infection was attributed to infective
dust inhalation.13 Three other cases of Machupo infection occurred
in a hospital cluster. Two of the cases were nurses who cared for a
patient with Bolivian hemorrhagic fever during the last 3 days of
disease and life, in which the mode of infection was probably
mucocutaneous, though there was also the possibility of infective
aerosol involvement. The clinical presentation in one of these
nurses was of classical Bolivian hemorrhagic fever, with 10 days of
incubation followed by jaundice, necrotizing bronchopneumonia,
hemorrhages, and death on the 12th day of illness. Clinically, the
other nurse developed fever and nausea after 9 days of incubation
and was hospitalized 6 days after, following which hemorrhagic
fever presented; the nurse recovered on the 11th day of
hospitalization. The third analyzed case in this cluster was a
medical examinerwho cut his thumbwhile performing an autopsy
on the ﬁrst nurse at 3-h post-mortem. He immersed the thumb in
formalin, changed his gloves, and resumed the autopsy. After 4
days of incubation, fever (38 8C) manifested, with subsequent
jaundice requiring the hospitalization of this case. Hemorrhagic
fever then manifested and he died 5 days after hospitalization,
with disseminated parenchymal necrosis and lung consolidation
being found on pathological analysis.29
Another accidental infection case occurred through aerosol
inhalation during initial works on the characterization of Sabia
virus. This case presented with a 3–4-week period of incubation (a
long period of incubation for a New World arenavirus) and a non-
lethal hemorrhagic fever.30 A second laboratory infection with
Sabia virus and aerosol inhalation as the mode of infection
occurred in a biosafety level 3 (BSL3) facility. Despite that, the
researcher only wore a disposable gown, two pairs of gloves, and a
surgical mask (droplet protection only), which constitute BSL2
personal protective equipment. The researcher had no positive
pressure high efﬁciency particulate air (HEPA) ﬁltered respirator,
and after performing a centrifugation of 200 ml of viral suspension
in a bottle with Vero cell culture (high titer viral suspension with
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rotor and the outside of the bottlewaswetwhen the lid of the rotor
was opened by the virologist. After 8 days of incubation the
researcher presented myalgia, neck stiffness, fever, and headache.
On hospitalization, fever (37.6 8C), tachycardia (96 bpm), hemato-
crit of 42%, leukopenia, platelet count of 138 109/l, andmoderate
proteinuria were present, and intravenous ribavirin was adminis-
tered for 9 days. On the second day of hospitalization the white
blood cell count reached a nadir of 1.3  109/l and the platelet
count was 98  109/l. No hemorrhages presented and the patient
made a complete recovery after 10 days in hospital.31
Twenty-one LCMV infections with aerosol inhalation as the
mode of infection occurred in a hospital; strikingly half of the cases
developed only fever and myalgia, an extremely mild presentation
for LCMV infections.32
The accidental infections with hantavirus in laboratories
included 149 cases, of which 147 had infective aerosol inhalation
as mode of infection. One hundred and twenty-six of the total
hantavirus cases were infected with the B1 strain of Puumala virus
(PUUV), of which two cases are of particular note: a case with
percutaneous mode of infection due to an infected rat bite and a
case of conventional percutaneous mode of infection, both of
whom had hemorrhagic fever with renal syndrome (HFRS).33
Of the 14 cases of SARS, 13 occurred in hospitals with droplet
inhalation as the mode of infection and an incubation period
ranging from 2 to 7 days, followed by the development of typical
pneumonia.34 The remaining case occurred in a laboratory, had
aerosol inhalation as the mode of infection, and had an atypical
clinical development with only fever and minor upper respiratory
symptoms.35 The absence of droplet precautions, namely the use of
surgical masks as primary personal protective equipment, was a
critical factor in the SARS-CoV hospital infections.
The accidental hospital infections with airborne viruses
retrieved and analyzed in this study are the LCMV infection cases
of 1975,32 the SARS cases of 2003,34 and the Bolivian hemorrhagic
fever of 1971 (Table 213,27–39). An incomplete predominance of the
conventional modes of infection is clearly shown in Table 2.13,27–39Table 2
Summary table for infections with airborne viruses in the laboratory and hospital settin
modes of infection, and clinical development characteristics
Setting Family Virus Mode of transmission
Percutaneous Aerosol
exposure/
inhalation
Drop
inhal
Laboratory Arenaviridae LCMV 50 50
Sabia 100
Machupo 100
Total cases 20 80
Bunyaviridae Hantavirus 1.3 98.7
Coronaviridae SARS-CoV 100
Orthomyxoviridae Inﬂuenza B
Picornaviridae Coxsackievirus 50 25
Total laboratory
cases
2 96 0.6
Hospital Arenaviridae Machupo 33
LCMV 100
Total cases 4 88
Coronaviridae SARS-COV 100
Total hospital
cases
2.7 56.8 35.1
LCMV, lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus; HFRS, hemorrhagic fever with renal syndrom
syndrome coronavirus.3.2.3. Blood-borne viruses
The majority of accidental infections by blood-borne viruses
analyzed in this study occurred in the hospital setting, with 152
cases from 17 references, in contrast with the 13 cases of
laboratory infection from two references (Table 3).
The 13 cases in laboratories were caused by parvovirus B19
(nine cases), with the supposed mode of infection as aerosol
inhalation and no further information on the infection event or the
clinical outcome,40 and HIV-1 (four cases). Among the 152 hospital
cases analyzed, 142 involved the percutaneous mode of infection
non-exclusively and 12 involved the mucocutaneous mode of
infection non-exclusively (two of which involved inocula contact
with the conjunctiva41,42). Of these 152 cases, 51 were caused by
HCV, 91 by HIV (one of which was of simultaneous HIV and HCV
infection), eight by parvovirus B19, two by hepatitis B virus (HBV;
one of whichwas of simultaneous HBV and hepatitis D virus (HDV/
delta virus) infection), and one by hepatitis G virus (HGV).42–47One
case of HIV infection that occurred in a laboratory before 1988 is of
great relevance, as the researcher suffered an infection with an in
vitro culture-adapted strain of HIV-1 while working in BSL3
conditions carrying out viral stock production procedures. This
infection was associated with repeated viral suspension spills
inside the centrifuge and in the work area.46
Another noteworthy case was a fulminant hepatitis B case
whose mode of infection wasmucocutaneous due to contact of the
nurse’s conjunctiva with a hepatitis B e antigen (HBeAg)-negative
HBV carrier patient’s saliva. Such a case exempliﬁes an infection
with exceptional severity given the low risk exposure involved
once HBeAg is the main marker for the source patient’s
infectivity;42 such an infection argues for the case of the relevance
of susceptibility of the inoculated person. Another exceptional case
was an accidental simultaneous infection with HCV and HIV by
percutaneous mode of infection.43 For the HCV the period of
incubation was 44 days and was followed by mild acute
hepatitis.43 Three other HCV infection cases were remarkable
due to the exceptionally short incubation periods following
percutaneous infection. One of them had a period of incubationgs: total number of cases analyzed, overview of percentages according to the main
Clinical development Total
number
of cases
Ref.
let
ation
Mucocutaneous Oral
Normal to severe
(meningo-encephalitis)
2 27,28
Normal 2 30,31
Not described 1 13
(See above) 5 13,27,28,30,31
Normal to severe
(one death and one
HFRS with DIC)
149 33,36,37
Mild 1 35
100 Conjunctivitis (atypical) 1 38
25 Normal to atypical
(one with nausea
and diarrhea)
4 39
0.6 0.6 (See above) 160 13,27,28,30,
31,33,35–39
66 Normal (lethal for
two of the cases)
3 29
Extremely mild 21 32
8 (See above) 24 29,32
Normal 13 34
5.4 (See above) 37 29,32,34
e; DIC, disseminated intravascular coagulation; SARS-CoV; severe acute respiratory
Table 3
Summary table for infectionswith blood-borne viruses in the laboratory and hospital settings: total number of cases analyzed, overview of percentages according to themain
modes of infection, and clinical development characteristics
Setting Family Virus Mode of transmission Clinical
development
Total number
of cases
Ref.
Percutaneous Aerosol
exposure/
inhalation
Mucocutaneous
Laboratory Parvoviridae Parvo-B19 100 9 40
Retroviridae HIV-1 75 25 Normal (seropositivity) 4 46
Total laboratory cases 23 77 (See above) 13 40,46
Hospital Retroviridae HIV-1 98 2 (8)a Normal 91b 43,46
Parvoviridae Parvo-B19 100 8 44
Flaviviridae HCV 98 2 Normal to atypical
(see Table 4)
51b 41,43,48–57
HGV 100 Unapparent 1 47
Total cases 98 2 (See above) 52 41,43,47–57
Hepadnaviridae HBV 50 50 Normal to severe
(one fulminant hepatitis)
2c 42,45
Deltaviridae HDV 100 Normal (acute hepatitis
after 90 days)
1c 45
Total hospital
cases
93 7d (See above) 152 41–57
Parvo-B19, parvovirus B19; HIV, human immunodeﬁciency virus; HCV, hepatitis C virus; HGV, hepatitis G virus; HBV, hepatitis B virus; HDV, hepatitis D virus (delta virus).
a Two percent refers to cases of mucocutaneous mode of infection only, and 8% refers to simultaneous mucocutaneous and percutaneous modes of infection.
b Refers to a single case of simultaneous infection with HIV and HCV.
c Refers to a single case of simultaneous infection with HBV and HDV.
d Refers to cases with mucocutaneous mode of infection only.
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while the normal period of incubation for HCV is approximately 2
months;49 these cases developed acute hepatitis.
Table 340–57 shows the clear predominance of the percutaneous
mode of infection for HIV and HCV, but not for parvovirus B19
infections. The low number of HBV and HGV infections limits
comparisons by their modes of infection (Table 3).
The cluster of eight cases of parvovirus B19 at a hospital, with the
mucocutaneous mode of infection, shows the differentiated
dynamics of this virus, with relevant involvement of fomites in
the process given the evidence of widespread contamination of
surfaces by the virus in the ward where the cases occurred.44 The
critical biosafety aspects for the occurrence of these infectionswere
ineffective disinfection of theward surfaces, insufﬁcient changing of
gloves, and inadequatehanddisinfection, characterizing incomplete
implementation of the standard precautions byhealth careworkers.
Table 4 shows six cases that presented particularly dangerous
situations: the three cases of acute hepatitis caused by HCV with
periods of incubation far shorter than normally found and
expected by health care workers, the case of fulminant hepatitis
caused by HBV after exposure considered to be of insigniﬁcant risk
by health care workers, one case of unapparent infection by HGV
which causes hepatitis and still attracts little attention from health
care workers, and one case of HIV-1 infection with an extremely
unexpectedmode of infection given the exceptional circumstances
of the case, as described above.
3.2.4. Viruses with preferential mucocutaneous mode of infection
Until now, the mucocutaneous mode of infection has referred to
contact between the mucosa and inoculum, yet among the virusesTable 4
Special cases of accidental blood-borne virus infection
Virus Number of cases Mode of infection
HCV 3 Percutaneous
HGV 1 Percutaneous
HIV 1 Aerosol contact/inhalation
HBV 1 Mucocutaneous
HCV, hepatitis C virus; HGV, hepatitis G virus; HIV, human immunodeﬁciency virus; Hmentioned below there are those that produce infection in contact
withunbrokenskin. The seriesof analyzedreportson infectionswith
these viruses begins with two cases of infection with herpes B
(Macacine herpesvirus 1; McHV1) in laboratory settings. The ﬁrst
case occurred in 1932 and was caused by an infected monkey bite
resulting in ascendingmyelitis anddeath. In the second case, a small
skin injury came into contactwith infectedmonkey saliva, resulting
initially in a local herpetic lesion and then in a clinical outcome
similar to the ﬁrst case, with respiratory arrest and death within a
few days.58 One additional infection with herpes B (McHV1)
occurred by mucocutaneous mode of infection in a research
laboratory setting. This case was exposed to unidentiﬁed secretions
of an infected macaque in the eye. Ten days after this exposure the
affectedeyewas swollenandredbutwithoutdendritic lesions, and5
days later the worker presented fever (38.5 8C) and conjunctivitis
and was hospitalized. Cerebrospinal ﬂuid examination showed the
presence of 8 lymphocytes/ml, and acyclovir (15 mg/kg) was
administered from 2 h after hospitalization. The worker was
discharged after 11 days on intravenous ganciclovir outpatient
therapy; 1 day later the worker suffered ascending myelitis and
subsequentlyﬂaccidparalysis. After thepresentationof seizures, the
clinical picture of postviral acute demyelinating encephalomyelitis
was considered and this patient was then treated with foscarnet.
Over the courseof9days thepatientdevelopednosocomial bacterial
pneumonia, and died 33 days after the beginning of symptoms from
refractory respiratory failure.59
A hospital infection with MARV occurred in a nurse following
the repeated handling without gloves of wet facial tissues
belonging to the companion of a patient with Marburg hemor-
rhagic fever. The patient withMarburg hemorrhagic fever died andClinical presentation Ref.
Short period of incubation (9 days to 2 weeks) 48–50
Unapparent 47
Seroconversion 46
Fulminant hepatitis 42
BV, hepatitis B virus.
Table 5
Summary table for accidental infections with viruses with preferential mucocutaneous transmission in the laboratory and hospital settings: total number of cases analyzed,
overview of percentages according to the main modes of infection, and clinical development characteristics
Environment Family Virus Mode of transmission Clinical
development
Total number
of cases
Ref.
Percutaneous Aerosol
exposure/
inhalation
Mucocutaneous
Laboratory Herpesviridae McHV1 66 33 Normal 3 58,59
Orthopoxviridae VACV 50 50a Normal 4 61–64
Arenaviridae Lassa 100b Normal 1 16,65
Total laboratory cases 50 12.5 37.5 8 16,58,59,61–65
Hospital Herpesviridae HSV-1 100 Normal 1 68
HZV 100 Normal 1 67
Arenaviridae Lassa 100 Normal 1 66
Filoviridae MARV 100 Atypical mild
(uveitis and
thrombocytopenia)
1 60
Total hospital cases 75 25 4 60,66–68
McHV1, Macacine herpesvirus 1; VACV, vaccinia virus; HSV-1, herpes simplex virus 1; HZV, herpes zoster virus; MARV, Marburg virus.
a Possible involvement of aerosol as source in one case of mucocutaneous mode of infection.
b Possible contact with infected secretions in addition to infective aerosol exposure.
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infection probably occurred through the mucocutaneous mode of
infection. The nurse developed retro-orbital pain, myalgia, and
fever (37.5–38.5 8C) and was hospitalized; 2 days later a low
platelet count of 49  109/l and diarrhea presented. On day 5 of
hospitalization amaculopapular rashwas present on the arm and 2
months later the nurse developed uveitis, after which a full
recovery was made. During the hospitalization period MARV was
isolated from a sample of the liquid from the anterior ocular
chamber.60 The lack of contact precautions and use of barrier
personal protective equipment were critical factors in this
infection, as is commonly found in African hemorrhagic fever
virus infections in health care workers.
Three cases of vaccinia virus (VACV) infection in laboratory
settings stand out: the ﬁrst case occurred as a result of
percutaneous infection by two recombinant strains, one contain-
ing the G gene and the second the 22-k gene, both from respiratory
syncytial virus; this case developed more severely, with an
incubation period of 3 days, followed by local tumor, rash,
erythematous papules, and severe lymphadenopathy.61 The
second case happened with direct contact between the skin and
the inoculum. The agent was a recombinant strain containing the
cytohesin 1 gene whose product inhibits the biochemical cascade
triggered by the binding of lymphocyte function-associated
antigen (LFA-1) to intercellular adhesion molecule 1 (ICAM-1),
therefore inhibiting inﬂammatory cell migration. Clinically, this
case presented a local hemorrhagic necrosis in one exposed ﬁnger
and a papule on the other exposed ﬁnger.62 The third case of VACV
infection occurred as a student processed a viral suspension of 1010
PFU/ml (high titer), and themost likelymode of infection identiﬁed
in this report was mucocutaneous, with viral particles carried by
the hands to the eyes; alternatively there was the possibility that
the eyes were exposed to infective aerosol. The clinical result of the
infectionwas classical purulent ocular vaccinia.63 The likelihood of
inoculum carried by hands to the eyes constitutes a clear breach of
adequate laboratory procedures and demonstrates the absence of
use of personal protective equipment (goggles) as a factor in the
occurrence of the infection.
Of a total of 12 cases of accidental infection with viruses of
preferential mucocutaneous mode of infection, only four took
place in the hospital setting. Of these, one was a case of Lassa virus
infection reported in 1970, one was caused by MARV, another was
a herpes zoster virus (HZV)67 infection with percutaneous mode of
infection that developed clinically as zoster after 2 days of
incubation, and one was a herpes simplex virus 1 (HSV-1; nownamed HHV-1, human herpes virus 1) percutaneous infection that
developed as herpetic whitlow 4 days after a needlestick injury to
the ﬁnger with a contaminated 22-gauge needle.68 Table 5 shows
that the percutaneous mode of infection has equal if not higher
importance than the mucocutaneous mode, the conventional
mode, an expected fact for both types of setting. The clinical
outcomes of these caseswerewithin the normal expected range for
the respective agents, but theywere severe, as the causative agents
were highly virulent with the exception of HZV and HHV-1.
3.2.5. Orally transmitted viruses
Only one report was retrieved of an outbreak among health care
workers at a hospital with 36 infections by a novel norovirus so
denominated Basel-NOV (Basel Norwalk-like virus). In this
outbreak no contaminated water or food was detected, but
signiﬁcant deviation from standard precaution procedures was
found through the ‘hazard analyses of critical check points’
(HACCP) methodology. The supposed chain of transmission was
initiated and mediated by fomites as the primary contaminant of
hands that then carried inocula to the mouths of the infected
persons.69 The incubation period of the clinical cases was 3 days
followed by fever, vomiting, and diarrhea, a typical clinical picture
for norovirus infections.
3.2.6. Chronological evolution of the reports of accidental viral
infection
The ﬁrst analyzed report of accidental viral infection was
published in 193525 and the last in 2006.63 This period is divided
into three intervals: the ﬁrst comprising the period 1935–1958, the
second 1959–1982, and the third 1983–2006.
For the ﬁrst 24 years, 28 reported cases were analyzed, all in
laboratories,5–8,14,25,27,28,32,39,58 20 of which were caused by
arboviruses and six by airborne viruses.27,28,39 Infective aerosol
was the source of infection in 22 cases, 19 of which were arbovirus
infections. Only two infections resulted from the percutaneous
mode of infection: one herpes B58 (currently named McHV1)71
infection due to an infected monkey bite and one possible self
inoculation of WEEV with a syringe.5
For the second 24-year period, 68 cases were studied, of which
31 occurred in hospitals (21with involvement of infective aerosols,
three percutaneous, and sevenmucocutaneous) and 37 occurred in
laboratories (31 with involvement of infective aerosols and four
through the percutaneous mode of infection, one of which was a
possible percutaneous mode combined with infective aerosol
inhalation). Within this period, six cases were caused by LIV (three
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inhalation, and the remaining cases through an unidentiﬁed mode
of infection11,12), three were caused by KFDV due to infective
aerosol inhalation in laboratory settings,17 ﬁve were caused by
CCHFV in a hospital with probable mucocutaneous mode of
infection,24 three were caused byMachupo in a hospital,29 21were
caused by LCMV (all in a hospital through aerosol inhalation),32 25
by Hantaan hantavirus (HTNV) with aerosol inhalation as mode of
infection,36,37 one by TBEVwith aerosol as source,13,16 one by SLEV
with aerosol as source,13 one by Machupo virus in a laboratory,13
and two by Lassa virus (one possibly through percutaneous mode
of infection and one with mucocutaneous and possible aerosol
inhalation as the mode of infection).65,66
The ﬁnal 24 years comprised reports of 367 analyzed cases, of
which 157 occurred in laboratories and 210 in hospitals. Of the
cases in the laboratory setting, 145 involved infective aerosols, and
124 of these were caused by PUUV hantavirus,33 one by SARS-
CoV,35 nine by parvovirus B19,40 one by MAYV,10 two by Sabia
virus,30,31 one by TBEV,15 six by Piry,26 and one by HIV-1.43 The
laboratory cases in this period are reported in 13 references.
During this period 210 hospital infections were analyzed and
reported in 26 references; 148 cases had a percutaneous mode of
infection, none were due to infective aerosols, 13 SARS cases were
due to droplet inhalation,34 13 involved the mucocutaneous mode
of infection, and 36 cases of Basel-NOV infection supposedly
occurred through the oral mode of infection.69
3.2.7. Relevant factors to accidental infection in the laboratory or
hospital setting
Of the 219 analyzed cases that took place in research
laboratories, 197 had aerosol as the source of infection, with
aerosol inhalation the mode of infection involved in 84% of
laboratory infections by arboviruses (94% of infections by
alphaviruses). This mode of infection was also implicated in 77%
of laboratory infections by blood-borne viruses and in 12.5% of
laboratory infections by viruses of preferential mucocutaneous
mode of infection. In laboratories, the percutaneous mode of
infection was found for 15.7% of the infections by arboviruses (33%
of the laboratory infections by ﬂaviviruses), with this mode of
infection also involved in 23% of infections by blood-borne viruses,
in 2% of infections by airborne viruses, and in 50% of infections by
preferential mucocutaneous transmission viruses. A total of 16
laboratory infections had the percutaneous mode of infection.
Among the 241 cases in the hospital setting, 151 had the
percutaneous mode of infection; this mode of infection was
involved in this setting in 41.6% of arbovirus infections, 92% of
blood-borne virus infections, 3% of airborne virus infections, and in
75% of the cases of preferential mucocutaneous transmission virus
infections. Of the total hospital infections, 27 had the mucocuta-
neous mode of infection (eight of these were caused by parvovirus
B19 and seven by HIV, of which ﬁve also had percutaneousmode of
infection involvement). This mode of infection was also possibly
involved in 19 reported HCV accidental infection cases.54 Seven-
teen of the 27 cases were caused by blood-borne viruses – a total
11% of the accidental infections caused by these viruses in
hospitals. Of the total analyzed accidental hospital infections, 21
had aerosol inhalation as the mode of infection, all caused by
LCMV. The remaining airborne virus infections in hospitals were
caused by SARS-CoV following infective droplet inhalation, and
Machupo virus with percutaneous or mucocutaneous mode of
infection. Fifteen percent of hospital infections had the oral
transmissionmode and occurred in a single outbreak of Basel-NOV.
As expected, the percutaneous mode of infection was found to
predominate in the hospital setting, with this mode relevant in
cases of arbovirus infections and infections by viruses of
preferential mucocutaneous mode of infection. The relationshipbetween the severity of the source case and the probability of
accidental infection is well established,2 but only a few analyzed
cases support this association, and the case of fulminant hepatitis
caused by HBVmucocutaneously is a noteworthy exception to that
potential correlation trend. The occurrence of atypical or
exceptionally severe cases in hospital settings, although rare, is
not insigniﬁcant, with eight cases (3.3% of hospital infections)
having no detectable correlation of their occurrencewith any of the
factors analyzed in this study.
4. Discussion
This study reveals unexpected patterns for accidental infections
in laboratories and dangerous exceptions to the supposed
dynamics of transmission in accidental infections in hospitals,
demonstrating the limitation of the real knowledge of the
dynamics of accidental infections in these settings. With regard
to the pattern of laboratory infection, this study establishes a clear
predominance of aerosol inhalation as the mode of infection, with
involvement in 96% of airborne virus infections, 84% of arbovirus
infections (in which stand out the alphaviruses for which 94% of
infections involved this mode, and Piry with 100% of the infections
by this mode), 77% of the infections by blood-borne viruses
(parvovirus B19 in particular deserves attention as 100% of the
laboratory cases had this mode of infection), and 12.5% of the
infections by viruses with preferential mucocutaneous mode of
infection. In contrast, the percutaneous mode answered for only
7.3% of the total analyzed laboratory infections. Paradoxically this
mode of infectionwas involved in 50% of infections by viruses with
preferential mucocutaneous infection and in 23% of those by
blood-borne viruses, and also in 16% of arbovirus infections.
Among these arbovirus infections, the ﬂaviviruses stand out with
regard to the involvement of this mode of infection (33% of the
infections in laboratories).
Analysis of the percutaneous mode of infection in arbovirus
infections had unexpected results given the two percutaneous
infections byWNV reported in 2002,19 and the difference between
the percentages of ﬂaviviruses and the entire viral group, 45% of
arbovirus infections through this mode were caused by DENV (all
between 1998 and 2004).20–23Apart from these results, the
description of cases of WNV infection due to blood transfusion
and organ transplantation72 despite the fact that the human is still
considered the terminal host in the conventional transmission
chain for this virus,73 the growing number of HCV infection
carriers, and the discovery in 199574 of HGV and its addition to the
group of blood-borne viruses causing hepatitis, point to the
evolutionary possibility of certain ﬂaviviruses becoming adapted
to the percutaneous mode of infection as an effective mode of
transmission.
The preponderance of the percutaneous mode of infection in
hospitals is demonstrated by the proportion of cases with
involvement of each mode; 62.6% of accidental infections in
hospitals were through percutaneous mode, while aerosol inhala-
tion was the mode of infection involved in a cluster of LCMV
infections accounting for 8.7% of the cases in hospitals. In
comparison, inhalation of infective droplets was involved in 13
SARS cases, accounting for 5.4% of the cases in hospitals, and a
cluster of norovirus infections in a Swiss hospital69 through oral
mode of infection accounted for 15% of the analyzed cases in the
hospital setting. In this study, only one cluster of accidental
infections with aerosol inhalation as the mode of infection in a
hospital was obtained from one report; this is probably a result of
the difﬁculty of conducting epidemiological surveys of such
infections, likely leading to sub-notiﬁcation of cases.
The comparison of the three time-periods in which the
analyzed reports were published clearly refutes the idea of a
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decrease in the importance of this mode of infection in laboratory
infections over time due to the methodological transition from in
vivo infection models to in vitro culture systems in virological
research. The number of analyzed cases has consistently grown
through these periods, the ﬁrst period did not include any hospital
cases, and there were more references and cases in the last period
than in the ﬁrst two put together, due mainly to hospital case
reports. These data support the idea of a decreasing sub-
notiﬁcation over time, and there are two reasons for these results:
the ﬁrst two periods correspond to the time of discovery and early
characterization of many of the analyzed viruses, whereas the last
period is marked by the development of the biosafety concept,
resulting in a greater number of notiﬁcations. Moreover, the
volume of virological research and the number of patients with
viral diseases in hospitals have both grown over time. There is a
uniformity in the laboratory viral infections proﬁle respective to
the mode of infection over time; remarkably only two of the
percutaneous infections in laboratories were reported in the ﬁrst
period. There are two complementary conclusions that can be
derived from these data: (1) there is no sub-notiﬁcation bias
speciﬁc to speciﬁc modes of infection over time, which was
unexpected, and (2) the measures and protocols of biosafety
generated to minimize the number of these accidental infections
involving speciﬁc modes of infection were less effective than
commonly supposed. In addition the majority of percutaneous
infections in the hospital setting during the last period occurred
with syringes after completion of the necessary procedure in the
patient and even during needle recapping, demonstrating clear
suboptimal implementation of the universal precautions, contact
precautions, body ﬂuid isolation, and standard practices of
infection control.
The main risk factors for accidental viral infections in research
laboratories are shown by the preponderance of work with high
viral loads in reports of infections due to infective aerosol
inhalation, with centrifugation as commonly present methodology
in these. Also 15 of 21 ﬁrst infections by arboviruses with aerosol
involvement occurred during work with infected animal tissue
suspensions. Another evident risk factor is the virus being handled,
not only this study demonstrates that Piry, WEEV, TBEV, and
alphaviruses in general are peculiar with respect to the risk of
productive infection upon inoculation through aerosol inhalation,
as the clinical severity of an infection by non-conventionalmode of
infection is clearly virus-orientated as displayed in WEEV, TBEV,
McHV1 infections, with a smaller contribution of host resistance
for the clinical presentation and outcome.
Different risks are reported in hospitals, with mainly percuta-
neous exposure reported, followed by respiratory exposures
(aerosols and droplet inhalation), oral exposure (one norovirus
outbreak from one reference – extrapolation of the respective data
to the general context is not appropriate), and mucocutaneous
exposures, which in this study are correlated with 11.2% of the
analyzed accidental hospital infections. However such results are
likely the product of a sub-notiﬁcation bias, as blood-borne viruses
are themost frequently diagnosed hospital infections and these are
the leading etiologies for infections by this mode of infection. No
consistent correlation analysis could be pursued for the probability
of infection or its severity and the deepness of the exposure with
regard to the modes of infection analyzed. Even a comparison for
the percutaneous and mucocutaneous modes of infection was not
feasible due to the lack of data with respect to the deepness of
exposure variable in a signiﬁcant portion of the reports; this
limitation hampered such a comparison even for those cases with
the percutaneous mode of infection. Similarly comparison
between the inocula in different cases for different modes of
infection was not feasible due to the limitations in the data withregard to the quantity of infective aerosol and droplets. Even the
data on inocula in percutaneous infections are limited. The best
approach for the issue is to use the clinical state of the source
patient as a parameter for the inocula. Such an approach gave
positive associations in the case of simultaneous HIV and HCV
accidental infection,43 in the case of Lassa hemorrhagic fever,16,66
and in a case of dengue fever caused by mucocutaneous exposure
for which the source patient presented secondary DENV infection
with hepatitis and signs indicative of dengue hemorrhagic fever.23
However the case of fulminant hepatitis by HBV42 and the lack of
data even in percutaneous case reports supporting this notion
decrease support for this idea. The atypical or exceptionally severe
infections in hospitals do not correlate with the mode of infection
or the viral agent involved, and neither a greater deepness of
exposure nor higher inocula were reported for these infections.
Therefore, although the potential contribution of these factors
cannot be ignored, the relevance of the individual host resistance
as a factor for the occurrence of such cases is well supported in the
hospital setting, whereas the relevance of this factor in such
processes is lower in laboratory settings, as supported by the
results and analyses presented herein.
The accidental infection risk dynamics for research laboratories
is dominated by infective aerosols and, to a lesser extent,
percutaneous infections, especially when the work involves
infected animals. In this context the need for minimization of
aerosol release and dispersion is clear, and therefore the global
adoption of aerosol release minimization procedures is recom-
mended, with emphasis on centrifugation and homogenization
procedures, the adoption of adequate directional ventilation
systems, and the use of personal protective equipment able to
reduce aerosol exposure, such as N95masks in areas of greater risk,
even in BSL2 settings are also recommended. In order to target
percutaneous exposures, complete training in the correct usage of
needles and sharps should be provided, the use of two pairs of
gloves is recommended, needlestick-prevention devices should be
used, and even the number of samples or animals to be processed
per batch should be limited in a given procedure.
With regard to hospital dynamics, the main risk to be
diminished is percutaneous exposure, followed by respiratory
and mucocutaneous exposure. Hence an expansion of the current
standard precautions is advisable. Strongly recommended are the
use of needlestick-prevention devices and the use of two pairs of
gloves, with the outer pair being changed whenever the current
standard precautions require the gloves to be changed. The use of a
mask and goggles is also recommended whenever dealing with a
feverish patient or whenever there is any reason to suspect a viral
infection, particularly a blood-borne viral infection. N95 masks are
highly recommended when treating patients with severe respira-
tory signs or in cases of hemorrhagic fever, and isolation is
recommended in these cases, especially the latter. Deﬁnitive
laboratory diagnosis and identiﬁcation of the etiology should be
sought when dealing with viral infections, especially the acute and
potentially lethal ones. Of the eight analyzed cases whose mode of
infection was completely unexpected (ﬁve percutaneous, one
mucocutaneous by DENV, and one mucocutaneous by YFV) and
whose clinical development was exceptionally fast and severe
(fulminant hepatitis by HBV with mucocutaneous infection), two
of the dengue cases (the mucocutaneous infection and one
percutaneous due to deep puncture) would have been avoided
by the strict adoption of standard precautions and three cases
would have been avoided if not only the standard precaution
protocols but also precautionary principle awareness had been in
effect. This basic principle of biosafety is here interpreted as
follows: total control of all the variables of a complex system is not
possible at any given time, therefore the adoption of risk
minimization and contingency measures against damages are
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under evaluation are considered insigniﬁcant a priori.
Emphasizing this last point there are reports related to
laboratory and hospital cases of lethal outcome or high epidemio-
logical risk presented by isolation and characterization of Lassa
virus, McHV1, and Sabia virus.30,58,65,66 The risk of contact with
viral human pathogens never before known to man is still present,
and is possibly increasing, as demonstrated by the linear curve
describing the discovery of new viruses through time from 1908 to
2008; the plotting of such a regression curve predicts the discovery
of between 10 and 40 new viruses up until 2020,74 with no
forecasts of the virulence of such pathogens.
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